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Time, Space, eSSence, and eidoS: 
a new Theory of cauSaTion
Graham harman
AbstrAct: This article attempts to develop the abandoned occasionalist model of causation into 
a credible present-day theory. if objects can never exhaust one another through their relations, 
it is hard to know how they can ever interact at all. This article handles the problem by dividing 
objects into two kinds: the real objects that emerge from heidegger’s tool-analysis and the 
intentional objects of husserl’s phenomenology. each of these objects turns out to be split by an 
additional rift between the object as an enduring unit and its plurality of traits. This explains 
heidegger’s notorious ‘fourfold’ model of the thing. This article shows that heidegger’s Geviert 
must be reinterpreted as a system of four tensions that can be identified as time, space, essence, 
and eidos. Time and space can no longer be left as peerless dimensions of the cosmos. instead, 
they are shown to arise from the tensions between things and their qualities. and for this reason 
they are joined by essence (in the classical sense of the term) and eidos (in husserl’s sense, not 
plato’s) as two out of four basic features of the fabric of the world.
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The title of this article might sound presumptuous or strange. The presumptuous part 
would stem from the adjective ‘new’. for some people this word implies absolute novelty, 
a new theory summoned from nowhere like a genie from a bottle. But such pristine 
newness would be neither possible nor desirable. The topic of causation has received 
considerable treatment from the dawn of philosophy, and the highlights of this story are 
widely known: aristotle’s four causes, the neo-platonic doctrine of emanation, the divine 
intervention found in islamic and french occasionalism, and hume’s skeptical doubts 
about causation along with Kant’s half-hearted solution. while these well-known theories 
cannot be considered in depth in what follows, their spirit will be present in what i say.
The strangeness of the title, by contrast, would arise from the topic of causality 
itself. with the exception of hume’s doubts about causal links, the theme of causation 
has largely vanished from philosophy. whether necessary causal connections can be 
established or not, how do they work? This is barely spoken of at all. while philosophers 
remain in perpetual anguish over the single gap between human and world, or the 
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denial of this gap in favor of a primal human-world correlate, causality seems to unfold 
in a place where philosophy no longer enters—the sphere of inanimate physical things. 
and since the natural sciences already deal with causation with such spectacular success, 
it may seem rude or unwise for philosophy to intrude on their terrain. in philosophy, 
we now feel most comfortable when dealing with the limited sphere of human-world 
interplay. we dare not venture outside, partly through fear that the sciences might strike 
back and invade philosophy’s humanized ghetto, reducing the mind to a brain and all 
things to narrowly physical interactions.
in this article i call on philosophy to rediscover its global vocation, to speak of 
the inanimate realm no less than the human-world gap (or non-gap, as some prefer). 
The way to do this is with an object-oriented metaphysics having a single problem at 
its core: the tension between objects and relations. The term ‘object’ as i use it means 
anything that exists. The term ‘relation’ means any interaction between these objects. i 
hold that such interaction is always a kind of translation or distortion, even at the level 
of inanimate things. in recent philosophy, the human relation with the world has been 
treated as an extra-special rip in the fabric of the cosmos. The human entity magically 
transcends the world in unprecedented fashion and becomes the star of philosophy, 
while inanimate relations are treated as mere boring clockwork—a dull mechanical 
onslaught where atoms and billiard balls slap each other into submission according to 
widely known physical laws. against this assumption, i claim that human beings are 
objects in precisely the same way as clots of physical matter. in addition, i claim that the 
relation between fire and cotton is of the same kind as that between fire and the mind. 
The same universal problem arises in both cases. it is a problem already known to the 
abandoned occasionalist tradition, which cannot remain abandoned any longer due to 
the contributions of a surprising figure—martin heidegger.
1. heideGGer’S occaSionaliSm
The words ‘heidegger’s occasionalism’ were possibly never spoken on earth until this 
very sentence. That is understandable, since the phrase sounds patently absurd. The 
occasionalists are remembered for their meddling God who intervenes in every least 
event in the universe, his continuous creation of a reality that otherwise disintegrates, 
and the impossibility of direct causal connections between any two substances. none 
of these topics seems even remotely relevant to heidegger, since he barely makes room 
for God at all and dismisses the concept of substance as belonging to the accursed 
‘metaphysics of presence’. obviously, i will not say that heidegger believes in an 
interventionist God or continuous creation. But i will contend that he is an occasionalist 
when it comes to the relations between beings. it is true that he never says anything of 
the sort, and to make the case requires that we do some violence to heidegger’s self-
understanding. But such violence is necessary here.
The point is this: heidegger inadvertently shows the difficulty of relations of any 
sort. The heart of his philosophy is the famous tool-analysis, and when read properly 
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this analysis makes a metaphysical case against relationality per se. This is the sense in 
which heidegger is an occasionalist. notice that i do not compare him with hume—i 
do not say ‘heidegger’s empiricism’, a far more ridiculous phrase than ‘heidegger’s 
occasionalism’. The reason he is no empiricist is that the gap he generates is not between 
two impressions or ideas, but between any two things. for him these things must be 
autonomous and inaccessible, and they have every reason to be called substances, in a 
slightly new sense of the term.
everyone is familiar with heidegger’s tool-analysis, so i will keep my summary 
brief. The phenomenology of husserl suspends the reality of the world in favor of an 
exact description of how it appears to consciousness. while there is more to husserl 
than this, it is accurate to say that husserl is unconcerned with the reality of things 
outside their accessibility to consciousness. in this way, phenomenology is one of the 
‘philosophies of human access’ par excellence—even more so than Kant’s philosophy, 
given husserl’s complete lack of interest in the Ding an Sich. husserl’s famous motto ‘to the 
things themselves’ means ‘to the phenomena themselves’, not to the noumena themselves.
heidegger’s tool-analysis has been seen, and rightly so, as a counterpoint to husserl’s 
extreme form of idealism. as heidegger notes, we do not usually deal with things as 
phenomena in consciousness. instead, we silently rely on them until they malfunction. 
The hammer is not noticed unless it breaks or is too painful or heavy to hold. we notice 
the ground only during earthquakes or when stepping on slippery ice. internal bodily 
organs are generally noticed only when we are being rushed to the hospital. This is 
all true enough. But the tool-analysis is usually trivialized into a pragmatist reading: 
heidegger thinks that all theory emerges from a shadowy background of unnoticed 
praxis. once this step is taken, it is easy to claim that heidegger merely echoes earlier 
insights of John dewey. But heidegger is a philosopher of being, not of human praxis—
and being for him is not just a meaningless slogan. The question of the meaning of 
being is often viewed as inscrutably deep and mysterious, and it is rarely noticed that 
heidegger gives a provisional answer to the question of being, if a largely negative one. 
namely, being for heidegger is that which is not present-at-hand, not vorhanden. among 
other things, this means that the being of a thing is not identical with its presence in 
human consciousness.
But the insight goes further than this, and if pushed hard enough it quickly 
becomes as weird as a ghost story. for when we say that the hammer is not something 
noticed in consciousness, this means that the hammer we perceive or think of is a mere 
shadow of its reality. The hammer in its subterranean reality is deeper and richer than 
the hammer we witness in the phenomenal sphere, which is only a shallow caricature 
of the hammer executing its own reality. But here comes an important point: human 
praxis is just as guilty of this caricature as human theory. To use the hammer does 
not give us any more intimate contact with the hammer’s reality than to see or to think 
about it does. The same sort of translation or distortion occurs in both cases—the 
hammer is rendered in a foreign tongue distant from the original. other features 
of this instrument, which may be of the greatest relevance to mosquitoes, bacteria, 
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angels, or nails, are left untranslated, ignored as if they did not exist. when it comes 
to distorting the subterranean life of beings, theory and praxis are equally guilty.
in other words, we should not be fooled by etymology and think that theory is about 
Vorhandenheit and praxis about Zuhandenheit. for surprisingly enough—both distortions 
give us nothing but Vorhandenheit! ready-to-hand does not mean ‘useful’ and present-at-
hand does not mean ‘visible’. instead, the ready-to-hand is the reality of the hammer itself 
apart from any distortion by human access, and the present-at-hand is whatever exists 
only in relation to such access, whether that axis is lucidly theoretical or unconsciously 
practical. This reading of Zuhandenheit as the lonely isolation of unique things is disputed 
by most heideggerians for a simple and understandable reason: namely, heidegger 
refers to Zuhandenheit as made up of a system of things, and states explicitly that it is not 
a series of individual tools lying around in isolation. But this objection overlooks a very 
important point—namely, tools only blend together in this system insofar as they do not 
break. yet the fact that they do break proves they are never fully integrated into the 
system of purposes in which human dasein makes use of them. Tools break because 
they are something a bit more, an excess of reality that no system can ever fully exploit, 
and which eventually returns to haunt every user. in effect, then, heidegger’s ready-to-
hand means ‘objects’ and his present-at-hand means ‘relations’.
But now comes the most surprising step of all—one that bursts the entire framework 
of post-Kantian philosophy and pushes heidegger tacitly in the direction of whitehead. 
for it is not just human theory and praxis that distort the autonomous reality of objects. 
humans do not have the unique gift or burden of translating entities into modified 
terms. nor is the situation improved if we expand the roster of distorting and translating 
entities to include the intelligent higher animals. philosophers must not cry out for 
dolphins, whales, dogs, monkeys, pigs, and crows to save them, for there is nothing they 
can do to help. in fact, any relation between any two entities must result in the same 
type of translation or distortion with which human dasein treats hammers. yes, i realize 
that humans display cognitive powers that only a charlatan would grant to flowers or 
sand. But these powers are merely a special case of what must be called ‘relations more 
generally’. The primary dualism in the world is not between matter and mind, but 
between objects and relations, and most relations will be unrecognizable as anything 
mental, just as objects turn out not to resemble what is usually called the physical.
in this respect all objects have autonomous reality apart from humans, apart from 
dolphins, apart from flowers, but also apart from stones. and since each of these hidden 
objects has a specific reality that distinguishes it from the others, each can be said to 
have a form—not an accidental form stamped in it by an outside entity, but a form in 
its own right, which the Scholastics and leibniz call a substantial form. But there are 
at least three ways in which these substances differ from the classical kind. first, they 
are infinitely withdrawn and cannot be brought into any relation without significant 
distortion; truth cannot be correspondence, since knowledge is a translation of real 
things rather than a copy of them. Second, substances do not need to be so-called 
‘natural kinds’. it hardly matters that sharks have existed for millions of years, iphones 
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for just two, and the obama administration for less than a year; all can be substances 
if they have an autonomous reality inexhaustible by any relations, as i hold that they 
do. and third, while the classical difference between substance and aggregate gives us a 
world with only two levels, the heidegger-inspired model of object-oriented philosophy 
gives us countless levels. a sports car is an autonomous reality compared with all the 
many uses of it. But the car is also a relational whole built of many parts, none of which 
the car fully exhausts (as proven by the fact that any of the parts can malfunction). each 
of these car parts, in turn, is made of further parts, and i do not doubt that this chain 
of assemblages stretches to the dankest infinities of hell and beyond. Kant’s Second 
antinomy is perhaps not an antinomy—for every entity has a definite qualitative 
character, and i would claim that to have such a character must mean to be articulated 
or constructed by pieces. in the classical theory, there was one zone of reality that was 
always substance and another that was always aggregate. But notice that an aggregate 
is like a substance when viewed from the outside—as with latour’s ‘black boxes’ or the 
‘assemblages’ of delanda.
objects or substantial forms, then, exist in all different sizes. But whatever size they 
may be, they have a problem relating to one another. and here we find heidegger’s 
link with the abandoned occasionalist tradition. on the one hand, objects withdraw 
into inscrutable depths. on the other, we know that they somehow relate, or nothing 
would happen and presence-at-hand would not exist. The impossibility of individual 
things making contact was first noted not by the french cartesians, but by the ash‘arite 
school of islamic theology in early medieval iraq. for al-ash‘ari and his followers, the 
omnipotence of God goes so far that other entities are deprived not just of the power 
of creation, but of any causal power at all. To use their favorite example, fire does not 
burn cotton—it is merely the occasion for God to burn the cotton. The same holds for all 
causal relations, not just those between mind and body. This notion was attacked even 
within islam, with the critique of averroës being the most famous. But it is supported by 
a particular passage in the Qur’an, and makes a good fit with the profound sense of fate 
and the almighty will of God that is generally even stronger in islam than in christianity. 
while similar passages can be found in the Bible in I and II Corinthians, it took hundreds 
of years for the occasionalist spirit to flourish in europe—until the seventeenth century, 
when relations became problematic for philosophy as never before.
This began, of course, in france. But it was perhaps foreshadowed in the 1590’s 
in the late Scholastic writings of francisco Suárez. on the surface, Suárez opposes all 
occasionalism, which he openly attacks decades before it even appears in europe. while 
it is obvious that Suárez is thoroughly schooled in various figures of islamic philosophy—
averroës, avicenna, avicebron—he seems unaware of the ash‘arite occasionalists of 
iraq. for Suárez says only that 
there was an old position which asserted that created things do nothing but instead 
that God effects all things in their presence, whereas action is attributed to fire, 
water, and so on because of the appearances and because God has resolved, as it 
were, to produce such effects only in the presence of such things. This opinion is 
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mentioned by averroës… by albertus magnus… and by St. Thomas aquinas… 
though there is no particular author whom they cite on its behalf.1
Suárez then digs up a few minor passages from european authors that seem to point 
in an occasionalist direction, which he would never have done if he were familiar with 
The Incoherence of  the Incoherence by averroës, where al-Ghazali of Baghdad is specifically 
attacked for occasionalist views. This scarcity of references is not so important, since 
Suárez attacks the anonymous occasionalists anyway. yet a bit of the occasionalist dna 
can be found even in Suárez’s own writings. after all, one of his most famous teachings 
is the incommunicability of individuals. he rejects the idea that form stamped in 
matter, materia signata, is the source of individuation. The work of individuation belongs 
to form alone; each thing is a highly specific modal compound. But this means that 
no form can shift from one material to another and still remain what it was: forms 
are untranslatable, immobilized in place, incommunicable. hence Suárez must place 
especial emphasis on the old Scholastic principle that things affect one another through 
accidents, not through some impossible direct contact between substantial forms. while 
the occasionalists see God as the glue of the world, and hume and Kant grant this 
honor to the habits or categories of the human mind, Suárez gives it to the accidents 
of individual substances. and this is closer to the true solution than when God or the 
human mind take all the glory. 
heidegger obviously never meant to be an occasionalist. in fact, it is fairly clear 
that heidegger never meant to abandon the interplay of human and world that has 
dominated philosophy since Kant. what is most typical of Kant, i would say, is that 
one type of relation becomes central to all philosophy—the duel between human and 
world. The relation between raindrops and sand is simply not a topic for Kant or 
most of his successors, and is left to the work of meteorologists. from Kant onward, 
natural science is granted a total monopoly on such issues, while philosophy cowers 
in the slum of human-world interaction, desperately fighting off the incursions 
of cognitive science with the mixed emotions of contempt and fear. But despite 
heidegger’s apparent willingness to remain in the Kantian fortress, his tool-analysis 
takes us much further. There is a universal problem in the relation between any two 
entities, since they withdraw into concealed depths, yet they must somehow break 
out of those depths to engage in the interactions that characterize our world. This 
cannot be done with the deus ex machina of the malebranchian God, but also not with 
the mens ex machina of hume’s customary conjunction. for heidegger these would be 
merely ‘ontic’ solutions, choosing a sole princess entity to be granted all relational 
power in the cosmos. a more likely solution would resemble that of Suárez, with 
accidents forming the glue between incommunicable substantial forms. yet so far we 
have spoken only of the difference between substance and relation, and have said 
nothing of substance and accident.
     1. francisco Suárez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19, trans. a. freddoso, new 
haven, yale university press, 1994, p. 37. wording slightly modified, and emphasis added.
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2. The inTerior of oBJecTS
Surprisingly enough, this is where edmund husserl comes to our assistance. it is well 
known that husserl’s intellectual father was franz Brentano, a figure often cited for 
an idea or two but rarely read in his own right anymore. yet Brentano’s brilliance of 
argument is astonishing, and his charisma as remarkable as that of rasputin—a person 
he physically resembles in certain photographs. our interest for now is limited to his 
most famous idea: intentionality, or ‘intentional inexistence’. what typifies mental acts 
for Brentano is that they contain immanent objects. my wishes, hatreds, and intellectual 
activity all aim at objects, and those objects are contained in the mental sphere. Brentano’s 
great polish disciple, Kazimierz Twardowski, noted the one-sided character of this 
model. it makes little room for a non-immanent reality , a world outside the mind. 
Twardowski’s early masterpiece On the Content and Object of  Presentations is still available in 
english, though at the usual outrageous price of books published by martinus nijhoff.2 
The phrase ‘content and object’ already gives us the essence of Twardowski’s philosophy. 
Strictly speaking there are not objects immanent in the mind. rather, there are objects 
outside the mind and mental contents inside the mind. in this way Twardowski establishes 
two layers of the world, though he also unifies these layers by saying that metaphysics 
is the science of objects in general —whether these be real physical masses or mental 
entities that never escape the immanent sphere.
Twardowski served edmund husserl as both an inspiration and a rival. one 
possible reading of husserl’s early career is that it was nothing but a struggle with 
Twardowski, his fellow Brentano pupil. husserl’s references to his younger peer are 
sometimes flattering, sometimes brutal, but always emotionally charged: all signs of a 
genuine struggle. it is well known that husserl rejects the Twardowskian split between 
an object outside consciousness and a content lying within it. when i speak of the city 
of Berlin, husserl says, the Berlin of which i speak and Berlin itself are the same thing, 
not two.3 while this may sound like a realist philosophy of language, in practice it pushes 
husserl increasingly towards idealism as the years go by, since what he really means is 
that there is no Berlin-in-itself that could not be the correlate of some consciousness. 
and here is the source of most critiques of husserl, justified or otherwise. for public 
attention has been focused almost exclusively on the ‘idealist’ side of husserl, who 
seems to lose the real world in a way that heidegger, natural science, and even deleuze 
supposedly avoid. nor do i say so with a sarcastic tone, since i find this criticism of 
husserl to be basically correct. yet it also misses half of the point, for husserl makes an 
additional move that may be unprecedented in the history of philosophy. The dispute 
between husserl and Twardowski (carried out largely in one direction) may look like 
a predictable quarrel between one thinker who insists on a world outside the mind 
and another who denies it. But in fact, husserl never dropped Twardowski’s distinction 
     2. Kasimir Twardowski, On the Content and Object of  Presentations, trans. r. Grossmann, The hague, mar-
tinus nijhoff, 1977.
     3. edmund husserl, ‘intentional objects’, in Early Writings in the Philosophy of  Logic and Mathematics, trans. d. 
willard, dordrecht, Kluwer, 1994, p. 347.
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between object and content—he simply displaced it. for even though we never find much 
of a real world in husserl, the distinction between object and content remains central for 
him. But it is now a distinction within the mental sphere rather than one that straddles 
the divide between inside and outside. That is to say, phenomena themselves are split into 
object and content for husserl.
in a sense this is already familiar from the way his phenomenological descriptions 
work. consider the following example: i observe a tree by circling it from many different 
angles, at different times of day, and in slightly different moods. in each of these cases the 
tree appears by way of vastly different qualities. even so, for as long as i take it to be the 
same tree, i never imagine that it is anything other than a unified thing. The same eidos 
of the tree is present in all these cases, no matter how different the accidental qualities 
through which it might be manifest. This aspect of husserl is generally overlooked, simply 
because no one feels the need of an insight on this front. most philosophers silently assume 
that the empiricists are right—that an object of perception is nothing but a ‘bundle 
of qualities’. it is widely assumed that only reactionary fools believe in some reality to 
objects over and above qualities amassed in a packet. But husserl teaches otherwise: in 
consciousness an object is always manifested through specific content, yet it always exceeds 
that content. moreover, he does not do this through some sort of hypocritical pointing 
toward an outside world, for it remains purely immanent. husserl repeatedly denies the 
immanence of it, but only because he does not believe in any transcendent world that would 
render the phenomenal one purely immanent by comparison. But when contrasted with 
a realist world, husserl’s object/content model is entirely immanent. The unified tree 
that i witness through all my experience might be a sheer illusion, after all. There is no 
reason to identify it with a real tree. it is a unified tree-object immanent in consciousness, 
accompanied by a unified tree-content through which it always appears, but which varies 
in the wildest manner and is never identical with it.
as i see it, this claim is decisive for the phenomenal realm, and the works of husserl 
and merleau-ponty do much to bolster it. But what if we abandon husserl’s idealism 
and leave the sphere of consciousness? is the same duality between object and content 
found in real objects as is found in intentional ones? if we believe leibniz (and i usually 
do) the answer is yes. in paragraph 2 of the Monadology, leibniz says that the simplicity 
of the monads ‘does not prevent a multiplicity of modifications, which must be found 
together in this same simple substance’, and in fact a monad ‘can be distinguished from 
another only by its internal qualities’.4 Various Scholastics had said the same thing, 
and aristotle in the Metaphysics already raised the question of whether a substance is 
the same as its essence. But husserl was probably the first philosopher to double up 
appearance into an object-pole and a quality-pole, and was surely the first to show how 
this works concretely in our perceptions of a mailbox, blackbird, tree, or anything else.
husserl’s insight raises new complications for us. earlier, i spoke of the occasionalist 
problem of how two separate objects relate. But husserl, and on a different level leibniz, 
     4. G.w. leibniz, ‘monadology,’ in Philosophical Essays, trans. r. ariew and d. Garber, indianapolis, hack-
ett, 1989, p. 207.
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draws our attention to relations within objects. how does a real object relate to its own 
genuine features, and how does an intentional object relate to its own accidental profiles? 
and further, when two real objects relate through some occasionalistic third term, are 
they relating through their object-poles or their quality-poles? instead of a single kind of 
relation to worry about, we now have three or maybe four.
But for the moment, let’s forget this husserl/leibniz fourfold and return to another 
aspect of husserl that is too little discussed. i refer to his assertion in the Logical Investigations 
that intentionality is both one and two. The meaning of this statement is simple, yet its 
implications that took me seventeen years to digest after first reading it. consider once 
more the perception of a tree, and forget for a moment about the duel between the tree 
as a tangible content of colors and shapes and the tree as an underlying unit or eidos 
that endures despite all variations in surface content. focus instead on a simpler aspect 
of the intention: the relation between me and the tree. on the one hand, the tree and 
i are distinct. we do not fuse together in instantaneous union; i never confuse myself 
with the tree. in that sense the intention is made up of two equally primary elements—
the object and i are two. But on the other hand the intentional relationship is one, since 
the object and i are together. five minutes from now, even if the tree is left behind or 
destroyed, i can still analyze this intentional relationship in memory, and other humans 
can analyze it at any moment too. in short, the intentional relation has an inherent reality 
that is never exhausted by analyzing it. husserl does usually claim that direct, perfect 
intuition into an intention is possible, that pure introspective evidence can be had, and 
he has come under heavy criticism for this both by heideggerians and by various recent 
philosophers of mind. yet if we simply ignore this part of husserl’s philosophy, nothing 
much changes. it seems clear enough that the intentional relation between me and the 
tree has a unified reality that cannot be exhausted by any description or translation of it.
and this real unity is enough to call the relation an object. why would anyone dispute 
this? for one thing, the relation does not last very long. Goethe once remarked that the 
most beautiful sunset in the world would still bore anyone after fifteen minutes, and a 
fortiori it is not interesting to stare at a tree for very long. This transience of the relationship 
seems to be a problem, since we normally think of objects as durable solid things. But 
recall that there is also nothing durable about most antimatter, or californium and the 
other exotic chemical elements lurking near the misty peak of the periodic table, or 
mayflies which die after minutes or days of adult life, or even the continent of asia when 
we look at the long past and future of continental drift. durability is not a good criterion 
for objects. for another thing, the intentional relation is produced by a human and does 
not exist by nature, whereas classical philosophies are usually willing to treat only natural 
things as real objects. But it seems foolish to deny objecthood to such artificial things 
as a factory or knife, or to genetically engineered tomatoes enhanced with the genes of 
coniferous trees and pigs. Thus, naturalness is not a good criterion for an object either. 
and finally, the complaint might be heard that the relation between me and the tree is 
not physical, whereas normally we like objects to be solid material things. But there are 
plenty of non-physical objects recognized even by those who do not believe in angels 
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or souls: numbers come to mind as one example. in short, the only criterion for a real 
object is that it be a unified thing with specific qualities, reducible neither to a bundle of 
qualities nor to its relation to us. and now, notice that the intentional relation between 
me and the tree meets all these criteria. The relation is one thing despite its plurality of 
parts. it has definite qualities that distinguish it from my grandmother’s perception of 
the tree or from my own perception of a fire. But it is not a bundle of such qualities, nor 
can any phenomenologist describe it exhaustively—not even if that phenomenologist is 
called God. if rocks and flowers are objects, then so are intentional relations.
and this leads us to draw a strange but inevitable conclusion, the only kind worth 
drawing in philosophy. insofar as intentionality is one, it is a single object. and insofar 
as intentionality is two, it is two objects: the tree and i. and the only place for these 
two objects to make contact is the interior of the one object defined by the intentional 
relation as a whole. This leads us toward a new theory of causation along several fronts. 
heidegger’s occasionalism recalled the seventeenth century lesson that there is something 
problematic about relations between real objects. in fact, it turned out to be impossible 
for real objects to make contact, since they will always confront limited caricatures or 
translations of each other. But the opposite model was found in empiricism: here, the 
contact has always already occurred, in the form of habit. hume’s doubts are not about 
whether customary conjunction ever happens (it obviously happens all the time) but 
only about whether there are hidden secret powers beyond the conjunctions that cause 
them to occur. These are the two opposite options. it is not so much a contrast between 
rationalism and empiricism, as Kant believed, since this is merely an epistemological 
difference as to how the world is known. instead, there is a deeper difference between 
occasionalism and empiricism. The first model accepts autonomous substances that do 
not interact, while the second model starts from the interaction and is skeptical about 
autonomous substance.
But there really are autonomous objects that withdraw from all interaction, just 
as occasionalists think. i base this on the authority of heidegger’s tool-analysis, which 
really needs to be read in the way that i have described. But there is also an internal 
space where interactions occur, just as hume prefers. nonetheless, there is one key 
problem with the occasionalists and three key problems with hume:
1. The problem with the occasionalists has already been mentioned. for they solve 
the problem of the relations between substances only by invoking God as a magical 
solution, shielded only by the good public repute of religion (which is merely reversed 
among intellectuals today). yet it is entirely unclear in a philosophical context how 
God can do what other substances cannot. hence, this is merely a classic instance 
of the ‘asylum of ignorance’.
The three problems with hume are as follows:
1. first, heidegger’s tool-analysis forces us away from the empiricist stance toward a 
theory of concealed real objects. for this reason, hume’s mens ex machina works no 
better than the deus ex machina, but for a different reason—it only accounts for half of 
reality, the half made up of impressions and ideas rather than the half made of bona 
Graham harman 11
fide realities. The fact that such realities are widely unpopular in 2009 means little to 
me; shifts of fashion in the history of philosophy are sudden, and they occur quite 
often through the return of dead concepts in better-engineered form.
2. Second, hume is too focused on the interaction or lack thereof between impressions 
or ideas (which i will unify with the single word ‘images’). But in fact, there is no such 
interaction. The image of cotton and the image of fire, or the images of two billiard 
balls, are merely contiguous, and always will be. The more important interaction 
is between me on the one hand, and these images on the other. i am not identical 
with what i see, as hume thinks when he says that i am a bundle of perceptions. 
on the contrary, i do not fuse together into these images as a single thing; i am 
perfectly aware that i am one thing and the images are another. hence, we should 
change our focus from the relation between two images to that between observer 
and image.
3. Third and finally, there is an asymmetry here that hume is unable to see, since he 
does not acknowledge the autonomy of real things. namely, although the intentional 
objects i confront are merely images, it is the real me that is involved in the experience. 
for it is not some image of me that sees two billiard balls collide. no, my genuine life 
consists in witnessing this collision right now. So although it is impossible for me as a 
real object to touch another real object, it is quite possible for me to touch intentional 
objects, as happens constantly. This already suggests another initial theorem for the 
new theory of causation: all relations occur only between asymmetrical partners. a real 
object withdraws from another real object, and two images merely sit side-by-side 
in an experience without touching. But a real object and an image are two kinds of 
objects that we already know can make contact, because that’s what experience is: 
someone or something confronting intentional objects. we may take this, then, as 
a basic law of causation: two objects in contact must always be of the two different 
kinds.
There is actually a fourth difference from hume as well, but it seems best to approach it 
through a critique of Brentano’s position. for when Brentano speaks about intentionality 
as immanent objectivity, he thinks immanent means ‘inside the human mind’. and there 
are two problems with this.
first, my relation to the intentional object ‘tree’ is not inside my mind. instead, both it and 
my mind are inside the relation between me and the tree. remember: the tree-image and i are 
on the interior of some object, and i am not that object. on the contrary, i am simply 
one of its two components. The unified object is the relation as a whole.
Second—and we now enter a strange landscape where hume and Brentano dare 
not venture—it is not only humans or sentient animals that do this. if two molecules of 
iron interact to form a new entity, they too will confront each other on the interior of 
that larger entity, and moreover will confront each other as translations or caricatures, 
as heidegger’s occasionalism already showed. in other words, the strange interior space 
where a real object confronts images need not have a human or a smart animal as 
one of its ingredients. Sentient creatures are just a more advanced case of a universal 
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drama between any two things. yes, human cognition is very different from the collision 
of two grains of salt, but the point is that both are built out of something even more 
primitive. This is overlooked both by human-centered philosophy and by many forms 
of panpsychism. human-centered thinking wants experience to be restricted to people 
and possibly a handful of clever dolphins and monkeys. at the opposite extreme, 
panpsychism wants something like human cognition already tacitly inscribed in grains 
of dust. But against such extreme panpsychism, human cognition is a very late and 
highly innovative form of the primitive reactions we are describing; contra human-
centered philosophy, it is not different in kind from physical collisions.
To summarize, two entities make contact only on the interior of a third, and it 
is an asymmetrical contact between a real object and an intentional one. naturally, 
there are always many intentional objects in any one experience, but all are linked 
only as experiences of the real perceiver. The intentional trees, horses, chairs, emeralds, 
and hallucinations that i experience in any one moment are merely contiguous in my 
experience. in addition, each of these intentional objects is torn in half between its 
unified reality and its plurality of accidental silhouettes. and the same holds true, as 
leibniz notes, at the level of real objects withdrawn from every view. Thus, we have 
discovered two kinds of relations between a thing and its own qualities (namely, at the 
real level and the image level), and one or more kinds of relation between real objects 
and their images as encountered by other objects—whether these others be human, 
animal, vegetable, plastic, or stone.
3. oBJecTS aS aSSemBlaGeS
if it is true that every relation generates a new object, it seems equally true that every 
object is pieced together from relations. Though i will insist on the heideggerian 
principle of withdrawal, and though i will also insist that an object is an emergent 
reality over and above its pieces, it is still the case that an object could not exist in 
this very moment without some pieces. But whenever i say that an object is real apart 
from all relations with its environment, the following complaint is often made: ‘objects 
are obviously dependent on their environment. if i were placed on Saturn or at the 
bottom of the sea, i would immediately be killed by their hostile conditions. This proves 
that my environment is a part of who i am’. But this is an equivocal use of the word 
‘dependence’. putting me on Saturn would certainly kill me, and so would injecting by 
body beneath the surface of the sea, but neither scenario would change the nature of the 
person being killed. By contrast, changing my component pieces (if pushed far enough) 
could change who i am even if the resulting creature survived for thousands of years, or 
even for eternity. my success depends on my environment, as do my partnerships and my 
physical survival, but my nature is not thus dependent. i am the same real object whether 
i endure on earth for forty more years or perish instantly on Saturn. But i am not the 
same real object if my pieces are shuffled beyond a certain point—a point that can be 
left undefined in this article.
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This gives us an assemblage theory of objects. according to this theory, an object is 
made up of a certain number of components. while it is tempting to call them ‘smaller’ 
components, this could betray a bias toward the physical realm. for the components are 
not necessarily smaller—in some sense opec or naTo are not physically larger than 
their component entities, and a friendship or marriage may not be larger than those it 
unites. But an object must have components; otherwise it would be purely simple and 
would have no qualities, as leibniz noted with his monads. To me this suggests that an 
infinite regress of compound entities is necessary. and that implies a delightful violation 
of Kant’s Second antinomy, thereby hinting at a method by which the rest of Kant’s 
transcendental dialectic may be undermined as well.
in our time an assemblage theory of entities is already in the air. it can be found in 
Bruno latour’s model of black boxes opened to reveal their internal components, with 
those component boxes then opened, and so on to infinity. The theory is worked out with 
a more candidly realist twist by manuel delanda in his recent book A New Philosophy of  
Society. what constitutes a true new assemblage, as opposed to a random list of words? 
delanda offers some criteria, and i will mention four of the most important. although 
the term ‘assemblage’ seems to suggest that an object is ‘many’ while downplaying its 
unity, there is no question that delanda also views his assemblages as unified things. 
one criterion for a real assemblage, surely the most important, is that a real assemblage 
has true emergent properties not found in its pieces. another, which is not openly stated 
but is tacitly present as the very foundation of delanda’s realism, is that an assemblage 
is deeper than any of its effects on its environment. another interesting criterion offered 
by delanda is ‘redundant causation’, meaning that the assemblage can be created 
by any number of different causal chains without losing its identity. my blood could 
be replaced with donated blood, or some of my bones hollowed out and filled with 
fiberglass, and i would remain the same object. and finally, an assemblage can have 
retroactive effects on its parts, or even create new ones. when a city is founded, this 
may have backwards effects on those who come to inhabit it, and will also generate new 
institutions and customs that were not initially present.
when we speak of ‘causation’ in relation to an assemblage, we naturally tend to 
think of its outward effects on other things, whether these be outer entities or its own 
interior components. The city of cairo has retroactive effects on its own pieces, such as 
police officers, and it also casts an economic shadow on Beni Suef, Tanta, ismailia, and 
other nearby egyptian cities, sparking and inhibiting their growth in specific ways. But 
all such criteria miss the primary meaning of cause: the reality of cairo itself. remember 
that every genuine relation forms a new object. To cause is to generate a new relation, 
and to do this is to create a new object, and objects have what was classically known as 
formal cause. But when we think of causation in daily life, we instead think of the mutual 
influence of two objects on each other, or efficient cause in the classical sense. when two 
fighter planes collide at an air show, we think that their impact caused damage so severe 
as to lead to the crash and explosion of both. But according to the model just sketched, 
this is merely a ‘retroactive effect on its parts’ of a larger collision-entity, to which we 
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never pay attention because it lasts so briefly and takes on little or no physical form. But 
the case of cairo is perhaps even more convincing. Quite apart from cairo’s effect on its 
parts or on other cities, cairo itself is a reality, or else it could achieve no effect at all. its 
reality is generated by a certain arrangement of its components, but somehow emerges 
as something over and above those components. it often has many effects on its parts 
and on other cities, but it does not need to have them. it is conceivable, even necessary, 
that the world is filled with millions of entities that have reality without an effect on 
anything else, at least for the moment. i find it wrong to hold that a thing is real only 
when it affects something else. in classical terms, there could be formal causes that have, 
now or forever, no function as efficient causes.
To repeat, the primary meaning of ‘cause’ is to create a new object. only secondarily 
does it mean that an object has an effect on others or retroactive impact on its own parts. 
if we see one thing influence another, this is merely a retroactive effect of a joint object 
that unites the two, or once did so. what i want to suggest is that this gives us a new 
way of reflecting on the principle of sufficient reason. for according to the model just 
sketched, sufficient reason is less a matter of knowing that the fire necessarily burned 
the cotton than of knowing that certain pieces arranged in a certain way necessarily 
resulted in the existence of cotton. if this could be shown, then the rules would be the 
same when fire and cotton combine to produce a joint entity called ‘burning cotton ball’. 
But if the fire might not burn the cotton the next time under the same circumstances, as 
hume holds, then it should also be true that the real components of the cotton arranged 
in a certain way might give rise next time not to cotton, but to steel or a rabid bat, or 
a miniature angel dancing in flame. a ‘mereological’ view of causation—objects as 
parts always generating new objects as wholes—would offer a new angle from which to 
approach hume’s problem.
4. a Quadruple coSmoloGy 
The model of the world presented here has a finite number of simple features whose 
interactions may shed light on a number of topics. first, we have numerous objects of 
all different sizes, in a chain of descending entities that is probably endless—‘turtles all 
the way down’, as the old joke puts it. These real objects withdraw from mutual contact, 
and encounter each other only as translations or caricatures. They somehow come 
into relation through a vicarious medium, and i have said that this medium can only 
be the interior of some other object—a perceptual space filled with intentional objects 
rather than real ones. moreover, the interiors are not just for humans and animals, since 
any entity encounters nothing but caricatures, and the relation to intentional objects 
must take place almost everywhere, in some ultra-primitive form from which more 
complicated animal cognition is built. every relation will also create a new object, and 
thus a new interior space with still other relations that might one day be generated.
Before clarifying the model further, let me say a word about panpsychism, which 
seems to be one shocking result of this theory. The accusation is often made that it it 
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is too ‘anthropomorphic’ to put psyche everywhere in the cosmos. But as i see it, this 
gets things backwards. The point is not to inject tiny human minds backwards into 
inanimate dirt, but the reverse: to show that what we call minds are simply enhanced 
versions of the crude contact with intentional objects found in any relation whatever. 
This sort of theory is usually the province of scientific reductionism, and it simply 
assumes that the root unit of the cosmos is mere physical impact between tiny material 
atoms. But this is both arbitrary and boring. By pushing heidegger’s respected tool-
analysis in an unorthodox direction, i have tried to show that even atomic collisions 
must involve intentional objects. imagining what this is like without falsely ascribing 
human emotional or intellectual features to atoms is difficult, but it could easily become 
the topic of a philosophical discipline called ‘speculative psychology’, which would try 
to probe toward what it is like not only to be a bat, or my mother, or martin heidegger, 
but also an atom, a grain of dust, an army, the exxon corporation, or france. 
But in another sense i am merely a polypsychist, not a panpsychist. for the panpsychists 
go too far when they say that every object has psyche; there is an option in between, and 
my theory is the first to make it visible. namely, i have claimed that absorption with 
intentional objects occurs only on the interior of some object, with one of that object’s 
real pieces confronting intentional caricatures of one or more others. But remember, i 
also claimed that a thing need not enter into relations at all in order to exist! an object 
is real, in this theory, when it unifies pieces into an emergent reality that has genuine 
qualities of its own. it does not automatically follow that this new object will have an 
impact on other objects, whether now or ever. There will always be some turbulent 
surface of the cosmos that has objects below it but none above. The need for an infinite 
regress does not also imply an infinite progress of objects. in this way, panpsychism is 
actually overthrown. To be out of relation is not to be dead, however, since the ‘body’ 
of the object is active as long as it is real. The surface of the cosmos is made of objects 
that are not dead, but sleeping —or dormant entities, to use the wonderful word that the 
anglo-Saxons copied from french long ago. in this sense, for humans to sleep is to rise 
to the surface of the turbulent sea, which would put dreams in a new and metaphysical 
perspective—giving us murky glimpses of undersea treasures.
we now return to the model itself. a real object is a unit or monad, which need 
not be durable, and only needs to unify pieces in order to generate new qualities. 
These qualities are not the same as the real object itself, and hence it lives in a kind of 
permanent strife with them, which is precisely what we mean by essence. This many-
featured essence must be there, leibniz says, or all monads would be exactly the same, 
which they are not. This real object hides from every view, and in my opinion (though 
not husserl’s, as we will see) its qualities do as well.
consider now the sphere of intentional objects. you can forget about panpsychism 
for a moment, since intentionality is much easier to grasp when thinking of the human-
centered version of Brentano, or better yet husserl. when perceiving a tree, there 
need not be any such tree at all; it is an intentional object, not a real one. as we saw, 
the intentional object also exists in strife with qualities, and these qualities can shift at 
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every moment without changing our recognition of the same underlying thing. and 
these qualities are what we call accidents. it is often believed that husserl’s intentional 
object also hides from view, since we never see every side of it at once. as was confessed 
earlier, i thought this way myself for nearly two decades before seeing the mistake. 
The intentional tree is always there before us whenever we recognize it. we live with 
the same tree no matter how many accidental profiles, adumbrations, Abschattungen 
we see of it. The intentional tree does not hide—it is there right before us, but forever 
encrusted with accidents. But in fact, ‘accidents’ is the name for the accidental qualities 
themselves, not for the tension between them and intentional objects. There is a 
different and even more famous name for this tension, but i will save it as a surprise 
for a minute from now.
with four poles in the cosmos (two kinds of objects, and two kinds of qualities) 
we also have four tensions between those poles. you might think that four terms 
means six unique pairs of relations; the reason it does not is because the tensions must 
always between an object-pole and a quality-pole. There is simply no ‘tension’ at all 
between real and intentional objects, or between real and sensual qualities; these sorts 
of relations deserve other names that are given in a forthcoming book. But the four 
tensions themselves are direct and palpable, and hence they serve as the glue of a lonely 
occasionalist universe that is desperate for any contact at all. But of the four needed 
tensions, so far we only have two.
we are now close to the climax, assuming that metaphysics has moments of climax. 
husserl claims that phenomenology allows us strip away all the accidents of an object 
and gain adequate intuitive insight into it. Being a good remote disciple of heidegger, i 
happen to disagree with husserl on this point, but it is not so important. what matters is 
only my agreement with him that an intentional object has two kinds of qualities. a house 
is encrusted by swirling patterns of lights and my own wild swings of mood. if we were 
somehow able to subtract all such accidents, even though we cannot, what would be left 
is not a featureless monadic lump. The house will always have some range of ineffable 
qualities, some houseness that makes us keep calling it the same though we never succeed 
in listing these features. if the swirling lights and moods that encrust the house are called 
accidents, the real features of the house can be called moments, and i hold that they are 
built of the same stuff as the qualities of real objects, thereby forming a link or ladder 
between the two layers of the world. The tension between an intentional object and its 
real moments is what husserl calls eidos, as opposed to the essence which is a tension 
between real objects and their moments.
That leaves only one remaining tension, in some ways the easiest of them all, since 
it lies at the heart of heidegger’s tool-analysis. a real object recedes from view into a 
subterranean underworld of being, but is translated for us by means of certain present-
at-hand features. There is a tension between a real object and its accidental manifestations. 
and this is what we call the object’s relations, since it refers to what happens when one 
real object becomes manifest to another. The four tensions have now been exhaustively 
named, and there can be no others, since there are only two kinds of objects and two 
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kinds of qualities. however, the second as well as the fourth have more familiar but 
more exciting names that i held back as a surprise.
The second tension was between an intentional tree and its surface-effects—its 
accidents. But if we speak of enduring units that subsist beneath outward changes, this 
is exactly what we mean by the experience of time.
The fourth tension was between the real tree (if there is such a thing) and the 
accidental qualities through which it is manifested. it is the tension between objects and 
relations. But this is precisely what we mean in everyday life by space.
Space and time are certainly not empty containers, as newton and clarke believed. 
But neither are they systems of relations generated by objects, as leibniz believed. 
instead, they are the tension of identity-in-difference, the strife between real objects 
and their accidents (space) or intentional objects and their accidents (time). and since 
under this model both space and time involve accidents as one of their poles, in a sense it 
is true that both are forms of perception, and Kant was right to say so—though only in 
a Kantianism extended beyond humans to flowers and inanimate things.
under this model, time and space are not primordial givens of the cosmos, but are 
derived from the inherent metaphysical tension between objects and their qualities. in 
childhood we all start out with a few philosophical questions that differ for each of us. 
later we move on to new problems through our reading and our professional training, 
and the arbitrary childhood starting points can be left behind. But in the present case i 
have the good fortune of returning to my earliest philosophical question of childhood: 
not time travel, nor whether space has more dimensions than we can see. But rather, 
why are time and space always spoken of as two utterly unique pieces of cosmic fabric? 
why is no other god ever treated as their equal? could there be others, with all of 
them branching out from a more basic underlying principle? The answer, over thirty 
years later, turned out to be yes, at least to my own satisfaction. Time and space are 
derived from the permanent tension between objects and their qualities —but so, we 
have seen, are essence and eidos. heidegger’s fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals 
had several problems. But one that has rarely been mentioned is that he used them for 
names of the four poles, when what is more interesting are the seismic fault-lines between 
them. all he did was place them on diagrams marked with diagonal lines, without ever 
naming them—except to speak of mirror-plays, weddings, dances, and songs, all of 
them interchangeable metaphors not correlated with any of the four specific rifts. But 
we now have a powerful new fourfold structure of time, space, essence, and eidos. it remains 
to be seen what might follow from this structure.
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